



GCC Proliferation Security Initiative Table Top Exercise

Dubai, United Arab Emirates
March 13, 2012



This book is for use with the GCC Proliferation Security Initiative Table Top Exercise, March 13, 2012. The contents of this book are UNCLASSIFIED. The content of the scenarios is intended to facilitate training and **contains no authentic intelligence information**. The scenario and information presented in this workbook are fictional. **All discussions that occur in the course of game play is strictly non-attributable.**

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Agenda

-----**March 13, 2012**-----

11:35-11:45 TTX Objectives and Scenario Questions

11:45-12:15 Move 1 Brief and Questions

12:15-12:45 Prayer

12:45-13:05 Excursion 1 and Discussion

13:05-13:35 Move 2 Brief and Questions

13:35-13:55 Excursion 2 and Discussion

13:55-14:30 Expanded Discussion and Wrap Up

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Purpose and Objectives


Purpose: This tabletop exercise is designed to allow practical application of the Statement of Interdiction Principles and explore how our countries may apply these principles.

Objectives:

- Examine Legal authorities currently available for interdiction, detention, seizure, and disposition of items of proliferation concern.
- Identify opportunities to strengthen national legal authorities.
- Exercise decision-making processes under compressed timelines.
- Identify opportunities and challenges to making policy and legal decisions to take action with limited and ambiguous information.
- Explore information gathering and sharing within and between governments.
- Demonstrate the benefits of cooperation within the context of the PSI

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Design Overview



- **The TTX will pose a series of general questions about a WMD-related interdiction scenario designed to generated plenary discussion.**
- **Participants will be asked to develop and share a position that includes a desired outcome and an action plan.**
- **The moderator will then pose additional “What If” questions that highlight potential interdiction occurrences.**
- **All participants are encouraged to discuss positions, share insights, and elicit best practices to identify potential opportunities to strengthen cooperation and legal authorities pertaining to WMD-related interdictions.**

Procedures

- The scenario presented in this TTX is fictional and was developed to meet TTX objectives.
- To encourage openness and free discussion, all player-produced products and discussions are to be considered for non-attribution,
- The presentations and comments of the participants will not be collected or analyzed and are only for use in this exercise.
- The game materials are yours to take with you as desired.

Scenario Overview

1. General

Country Overview:

- a. **Country of Proliferation Concern:** Country RED is a State of proliferation concern due to its efforts to obtain a uranium-enrichment capability and long-range missile technology and its refusal to comply fully with IAEA inspection requirements regarding its enrichment facilities. Country RED is believed to be engaged in efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their delivery systems, and it is suspected of trafficking in (usually by receiving or facilitating) WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials. Lacking necessary indigenous design and production capabilities, Country RED seeks materials and technology from around the world to support its enrichment and missile programs.
- Country RED has a history of exploiting the intermodal transportation system by trafficking prohibited items through transit/transshipment countries located along legitimate trade routes. Several United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) address Country RED's efforts, including:

(Except for UNSCR 1540, all UNSCRs are fictional)

- UNSCR 1540, adopted 28 April 2004, declared WMD proliferation to be a threat to international peace and security, and directed Member States to establish WMD domestic controls.
- UNSCR 2001, was the first proliferation-related embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on Country RED; prohibited the transfer of WMD-related materials to Country RED.
- UNSCR 2005, was the second proliferation-related embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on Country RED; prohibited Country RED exports of all conventional arms or related material.
- UNSCR 2009, was the third proliferation-related embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on Country RED; imposed expanded inspection requirements.
- UNSCR 2020 (Page 20), was the fourth proliferation-related embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on Country RED; prohibited the transfer of major conventional arms to Country RED; imposed expanded inspection provisions, including flag-State consent boarding at sea; provided disposal authorization.

- c. Technology Producing Countries: Country BLUE is an unwitting source of technology and materials to Country RED. Country RED front companies are actively pursuing missile production technology and equipment worldwide to meet orders placed by the Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, a Country RED subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG), which is involved in the production of ballistic missiles for Country RED.
- d. Transit/Transshipment Countries: Country Green is a country in good standing that is a key center for regional and global trade.
- e. Country ORANGE: Country ORANGE is a country in good standing that does not have a WMD program. However, its loose export control regulations may allow entities, working on behalf of Country RED to exploit opportunities to acquire and distribute controlled and uncontrolled technologies that could contribute to WMD programs.

3. General Questions:

The following questions should be considered at all points of the during the scenario:

- Given the situation presented in the scenario, what actions would your government consider?
- Which government departments would normally be involved?
- Which commercial organizations might need to be involved?
- What additional information would you consider necessary to better form and develop national courses of action?

GAME PLAY

1. Move 1

Initial Situation Report:



You are Country Green

Date: March 13, 2012

A PSI Partner has asked that you interdict a controlled, dual-use commodity to prevent it from going to a WMD-related program in a state of proliferation concern (Country RED) and has provided the following information:

- A controlled, dual-use commodity is in a container onboard a vessel which will arrive today in **Port Green**, a seaport in your country.
- The container has a final destination of **Port Red** in **Country RED**.
- You will be the last country able to take action on this shipment before it reaches its final destination.
- The PSI Partner advises that the dual-use commodity is on an IAEA control list (page 21) and is being shipped in violation of a United Nations Security Council Resolution (page 20).
- The shipment did not originate with this PSI Partner. They are providing the information based on “reliable” intelligence.

Update:



- In early February, a PSI Partner obtained information about the suspect resale of Country BLUE produced CNC 5-axis milling machines (See below and page 17) to a purchasing agent in Country ORANGE. This purchasing agent is known to support Country RED entities involved in missile technology and production efforts. The original shipping document from the originating country (Country BLUE) indicated

milling machine was produced by Dimani Manufacturing and the specifications on the original shipping document indicate that it is controlled per IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2.


- The PSI Partner subsequently learned that the shipment has been loaded in Port ORANGE aboard M/V *Sea Breeze* (page 16) and is scheduled to arrive in Country RED nine days later with one intervening port call in Port GREEN, Country GREEN. M/V *Sea Breeze* is flagged in Cyprus and owned by a German shipping company. The master is Latvian and the crew is comprised of Filipino and Korean mariners. None are believed to be complicit in the transfer. Shipping records possessed by M/V *Sea Breeze*'s owner (page 18) list a consignment of "freight of all kinds" and the Bill of Lading (page 19) indicates the contents are 5 crates of milled machine parts exported by Gefra Milling to Ishnav Manufacturing in RED City, Country RED. This consignment is believed to include the milling machine originally purchased from the Country BLUE. PSI Partner officials believe that the shipment's ultimate end user has ties to Country RED's missile production program.
- Prohibited Cargo: 5-Axis machines are the most advanced CNC (computer numeric controlled) milling machines, adding two more axes in addition to the three normal axes (XYZ). 5-Axis milling machines also have a B and C axis, allowing the horizontally mounted work piece to be rotated, essentially allowing asymmetric and eccentric turning. The fifth axis controls the tilt of the tool itself. When all of these axes are used in conjunction with each other, a competent and experienced machinist can produce extremely complicated geometries with very high precision. Many industries today, especially the high-tech, precision-dependent worlds of optical equipment, medical devices, satellites, aircraft, and aerospace, use 5-Axis machining as a means to speed manufacturing ability and increase repeatable accuracy.

Questions:

Based on the additional information you have received:

- If the suspect container were in-transit (remaining onboard the M/V *Sea Breeze*), under what national legal authority, if any, would you be able to order the off-loading of the container in your seaport?
- If the M/V *Sea Breeze* had not been scheduled to transit your seaport, but was redirected into port by the flag state, how would that change your authority to order the off-loading of the container?
- Under normal circumstances, what information would vessel owners/agents be required to present on shipments which are in-transit through your seaport and remaining onboard the same vessel?
- What agencies (military, customs, law enforcement, etc.) would be involved in the interdiction at this point in the scenario?

2. Excursion 1: “Transshipment”



“What if” a PSI Partner provides the following information?


- A controlled, dual-use commodity is in a container onboard currently onboard M/V *Sea Breeze*, a vessel which is currently in **Port Green**.
- M/V *Sea Breeze* will return to **Country ORANGE** in two days on a regularly scheduled route.
- The container in question is scheduled to be off-loaded from M/V *Sea Breeze* in **Port Green** and loaded onto a different vessel for further transport to **Port Red** in **Country RED**.
- You will be the last country able to take action on this shipment before it reaches its final destination.
- The PSI Partner advises that the dual-use commodity is on an IAEA control list and is being shipped in violation of a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
- The shipment did not originate with this PSI Partner. They are providing the information based on “reliable” intelligence.

Excursion Questions:

- Would the fact that the cargo in question is being transshipped through Port Green affect your ability to seize the shipment at this point, and if so, under what legal authority?
- If you seized the shipment, what options would you have to ultimately dispose of the shipment and under what legal basis?

3. Move 2

Initial Situation Report:



- You are Country GREEN in this scenario.
- The date is March 17, 2010.
- You have been asked by a *PSI partner* to interdict a controlled dual-use commodity to prevent it from going to a WMD program in a State of proliferation concern – Country RED.
- The suspect container that may have a controlled dual-use commodity inside is in Port Green, a seaport in Country Green.
- All documents from Move 1 pertain to Move 2 and should be used as part of the decision process for Move 2.

Update:




- Container TRLU6181109 (Page xx) is a consolidated shipment of goods being exported from Country ORANGE to Country RED. The container arrived on the *M/V Sea Breeze* into Port Green, a seaport in your country.
- Within container TRLU6181109 is a shipment of *milled machine parts* from *Gefra Milling* in Country ORANGE, which, according to the bill of lading, is destined to *Ishnav Manufacturing* in Country RED.
- The PSI partner indicated that the shipment from *Gefra Milling* actually contains a CNC 5-axis milling machine, which is a controlled commodity, and is destined to *Kasrav Industries* in Country RED, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2020.

Questions:

Based on the additional information you have received:

- Under what national legal authority and circumstances would you be able to screen, open, and inspect the container?
- Based on the information discovered during the exam, would you detain the shipment for additional inquiry, seize it outright, or release it back to the vessel owner/agent? Under what legal authority would you take this action?
- What agencies would determine, from a technical standpoint, if the commodity in question was in fact on the control list? How would they make this determination?
- What additional information would be needed to further the inquiry/investigation into this matter, and what agencies would carry out that inquiry/investigation?

4. Excursion 2: “Re-Export”



“What if” a PSI Partner provides the following information?

- Country Green’s customs authorities review all documents presented by the vessel owner/agent and conduct a screening inspection of container TRLU6181109 using a mobile container scanning device.
- The scanning image reveals 5 large crates among other packages. Inside the crates there appear to be machine parts and packing material.
- Country Green’s port authorities note that seal number 55660088 is still intact on the container door. They break the seal & open the container for inspection.
- The container is unloaded and the five crates pertaining to House Bill of Lading OFF987-6554 are separated. The remaining packages are re-stuffed inside the container and the container is resealed and released to the vessel owner/agent for on-ward travel to Country RED.
- The crate labeled “1 of 5” has a partially torn shipping label affixed to the outside indicating it is from *Dimani Manufacturing* of Country BLUE, and is destined to *Gefra Milling* in Country ORANGE. Opening the crate reveals an envelope with a shipping document inside. that identifies Country ORANGE as the final destination of the original shipment from Country BLUE

Excursion Questions:

- Would you be able to seize the shipment at this point, and if so, under what legal authority?
- If you seized the shipment, what options would you have to ultimately dispose of the shipment and under what legal basis?
- If in this scenario there was no violation of your law, but a request were made by Country BLUE to seize the shipment and return it to Country BLUE as a violation of its law, would you be able to seize the shipment? If so, under what authority/arrangements?
- How would the claim for damages be handled?

Vessel Data Sheet

M/V Sea Breeze



Vessel Name	M/V Sea Breeze
IMO Number	9151888
Registration Number	NB 3652 291
Call Sign	P3WZ9
Ship Type	Break Bulk Cargo/Container
DWT	8,965
Year Built	1999
Flag	Cyprus
Crew	21
Crew Nationality	Latvian (3), Filipino (13), Korean (5)

Current Voyage - S760:

Port Orange	ARR 07-03-12	DEP 09-03-12
Port Green	ARR 13-03-12	DEP 15-03-12

Shipping Document


Dimani Manufacturing CNC 5-Axis Milling Machine

Model: DMNI-7500

Machine specifications

Item		DMNI-7500
Travel	X-axis travel <longitudinal movement of saddle>	1,400 mm (55.1 in.)
	Y-axis travel <vertical movement of spindle head>	1,200 mm (47.2 in.)
	Z-axis travel <cross movement of table>	1,200 mm (47.2 in.)
	A-axis travel	150°(+30° to -120°)
	B-axis travel	360°
Table	Pallet working surface	630 × 630 mm (24.8 × 24.8 in.)
	Pallet loading capacity	800 kg (1,760 lb.)
	Max. workpiece height	850 mm (33.4 in.)
Spindle	Spindle speed	20 – 8000 rpm
Control System	Semper, Faraway, Herchel	

Manufactured by Dimani Manufacturing, Blue City, Country Blue



Vessel Manifest

M/V Sea Breeze

Voyage S760

Container	Contents	Shipper	Consignee
TRLU6181109	FAK (SLAC)	Orange Freight Forwarders Orange City, Country Orange	Red Consolidators Red City, Country Red
B/L Number	House Bills	Port of Origin	Port of Destination
LGAA12345678-0	12	Port Orange	Port Red
Seal Number	Hazardous Goods	Weight	Size
55660088	No	18,000 kg	40'

Definitions:

B/L: Bill of Lading

FAK: Freight all Kinds

SLAC: Shipper's Load and Count

M/V Sea Breeze

House Bill of Lading

BOL Number	House Bill	Exporter	Consignee
LGAA12345678-0	OFF987-6554	Gefra Milling Orange City, Country Orange	Ishnav Manufacturing Red City, Country Red
Packages	Contents	HTS	Hazardous Goods
5 crates	Milled machine parts	8409.99.10	No
Weight	Instructions: Contents fragile Contact Ishnav Manufacturing for pickup		
10,000 kg			

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2020

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

3. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Country RED, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery, namely:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

10. *Decides* that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex,

Annex:

A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme:

1. *Kasrav Industries*

IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2

1.B.2. Machine tools, as follows, and any combination thereof, for removing or cutting metals, ceramics, or composites, which, according to the manufacturer's technical specifications, can be equipped with electronic devices for simultaneous "contouring control" in two or more axes:

b. Machine tools for milling, having any of the following characteristics:

- 1. "Positioning accuracies" with all compensations available better (less) than 6 μm according to ISO 230/2 (1988) along any linear axis (overall positioning);**
- 2. Two or more contouring rotary axes; or**
- 3. Five or more axes, which can be coordinated simultaneously for "contouring control".**

Note: Item 1.B.2.b. does not control milling machines having both of the following characteristics:

- 1. X-axis travel greater than 2 m; and**
- 2. Overall "positioning accuracy" on the x-axis worse (more) than 30 microns according to ISO 230/2 (1988).**

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References

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UN Security Council Resolutions.....	31
General: 1540	
Iran: 1929	
DPRK: 1874	




Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles

Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:

1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:

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- a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
 - b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
 - c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
 - d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
 - e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
 - f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.



QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER WHEN CONDUCTING INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES

The following is a list of issues and actions that a state may choose to consider for maritime interdiction activity in support of the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles. This list is not exhaustive, and not all options may be available to all states at all times.

1. General Issues

1.1 If there is information that a shipment of concern is located on the land territory of a state, you may need to consider approaching that state's government to take steps available to it under its domestic authorities to prevent onward movement of the shipment. Such steps could involve law enforcement action against the entities or individuals conducting the shipment, to include the location, inspection, or seizure of the shipment itself.

1.2 In the maritime environment, you may need to consider boarding and searching a ship on the high seas, in another country's territorial waters, or in your own territorial waters. This may be your own flagged ship, a foreign-flagged ship, or a ship of no nationality.

1.2a Another country may request you to board and search its ship, or request your permission to board and search your ship, or you may make such requests of another country. These requests for assistance could be, but do not have to be, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement and must be in accordance with applicable domestic and international laws.

1.2b You may also need to consider (requesting/directing) diversion of a ship to a port to be searched. This may involve your own flagged ship or it may involve a request to a foreign-flagged ship or a ship of no nationality, most likely involving another country's port.

1.2c Diversion may follow from boarding a ship and deciding further inspection in a port is required.

1.2d Following the searching of a ship you may need to consider the seizure of relevant cargo.

2. Legal Issues: Boarding and searching a vessel

2.1 The following issues may be relevant for you to consider when contemplating the boarding and searching of a vessel. Further detail on the international law applicable to each of these is provided in the annex.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:

- Actions in the territorial sea;
- Law enforcement action by the flag state on the high seas;
- Law enforcement action against a foreign-flagged vessel on the high seas;
- Law enforcement action against vessels without nationality on the high seas;
- “Hot pursuit;”

Other applicable treaties or international agreements;

- United Nations Security Council Resolutions, possibly including 1718, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1860, and 1874.
- Domestic laws relating to export controls; general customs requirements; powers of detention, search and seizure; information sharing/privacy laws; issues surrounding possible prosecution (e.g. rules of procedure, due process); liability issues; health; transportation of hazardous and dangerous goods; and protection of the environment;
- Flag state consent;
- Coastal state consent;
- Port state consent; and
- International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).

2.2 Outline the domestic law relevant to diverting a ship to a port to be searched and the possible seizing of cargo. Consider the implications for your country if you are the flag state, port state, or the country making the request. You will also wish to bear in mind the interests of other countries whose nationals are on board.

2.3 For example, you may need to consider laws relating to general entry and customs requirements; export controls; powers of detention, search and seizure; information-sharing/privacy laws; issues surrounding possible prosecution (e.g. rules of procedure, due process); immigration requirements; liability issues; health; transportation of hazardous and dangerous goods; and protection of the environment.

3. Operational Response

Developing advice:

3.1 Consider nominating a lead department/agency to coordinate all matters associated with the boarding/searching/diversion of a ship in accordance with national legislation.

3.2 Consider what whole-of-government arrangements should be established to enable a coordinated response and to provide integrated, all-source advice to the responsible decision-making authority. Procedures which enable rapid decision-making would be most effective.

3.3 Consider nominating a 24-hour contact point for each department/agency.

3.4 Clarify what the responsibilities are for individual departments and agencies that may be involved. For example:

- Customs/border/law enforcement agencies : responsible for determining the legal basis for enforcement action. This may involve consultation on international legal aspects with relevant government agencies;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs : responsible for formal contact between governments, including embassies and consulates, and advice on wider policy issues and international law;
- Defense Department : determines available military assets, personnel, and operational planning and guidance;
- Intelligence organizations : provide advice and assessments; liaise with foreign counterparts;
- Justice Department : provides advice on domestic law and constitutional issues;
- Transport Department:– transport security; provides contact with industry.

Reaching a decision

3.5 Outline the processes for decision-making and what considerations may be relevant, for example, how much time is available, what expertise is available, whether

industry needs to be consulted and what the broader policy considerations might be (e.g. relations with other countries). Depending on the issue, you may need to consider information about the cargo involved e.g. the destination and supplier, what hazards the cargo poses and what related safety issues may arise, the flag, ownership, and registration of the ship and the nationality of the people on board. Practical considerations for boarding may include who will actually carry out the boarding/search, whether they are suitably equipped/trained, what powers they have, and what the security considerations are.

4. Cooperation with Other Countries, including PSI Partners

4.1 Consider what procedures and arrangements should be in place to ensure co-operation with PSI partners and to facilitate cooperation with other countries. For example, consider what procedures you should have in place to instigate a request for PSI cooperation, and also to respond to a request made of you. Which departments/agencies would need to be involved in decision-making, what are the relevant considerations in deciding how to respond to, or whether to instigate, a request, who will be the contact point/lead agency for cooperation, and what information/assurances might be sought/given?

4.2 Consider whether you could usefully develop a template for information, assistance, and assurances that you could provide when making a request of another country or that you might ask for when you receive a request from another country.

4.3 Compile a list of any bilateral or multilateral political undertakings or other arrangements/agreements you have with other countries that may be relevant e.g. relating to the sharing of information, the sharing of military assets, standard operating procedures for joint operations, and boarding agreements.

4.4 Consider what technical assistance you might require in order to be able to co-operate with interdiction partners, and where you might be able to draw that technical assistance from. If appropriate, consider what technical assistance you may be able to provide to other interdiction partners and in what circumstances (e.g. what requirements need to be satisfied before you can provide assistance).

4.5 Consider what restrictions or requirements there might be around sharing of information with other countries.

5. Intelligence/Sensitive Information

5.1 All decisions should be made on the basis of the best available information/intelligence.

Consider the following:

- Are procedures necessary to ensure that all those who need to have access to the information/intelligence (consistent with the requirement to maintain the security of the information) can do so? For example, have the necessary security clearances been obtained?
- What procedures are necessary to assess the reliability and accuracy of the intelligence?
- What collateral source information is available?
- Are procedures and systems in place for sharing the information/intelligence in a secure manner with those PSI partners or other countries with a “need-to-know”?
- What issues are there in relation to the use of intelligence in legal proceedings?

6. Disposition - Liability, Compensation and Prosecution

6.1 Where cargo is seized, consider how the seized cargo will be dealt with (including questions of storage and handling facilities) and who is going to do this.

6.2 Consider which agency will be the investigating and prosecuting authority. What needs to be done to lay the groundwork for a successful prosecution? For example, are there specific procedures required to maintain the chain of evidence, what information is able to be used in legal proceedings, and what impact does the classification of the information have?

6.3 Have any jurisdictional questions been resolved? If more than one state could assert jurisdiction, consider what steps would be taken to ascertain who would ultimately assert jurisdiction.

6.4 Consider who will most likely bear the costs, if any, from a counter-arms smuggling action (e.g. who may be liable for any costs flowing from delays caused by boarding and/or diversion). What implications/ramifications does that have? How might costs be mitigated?

6.5 Consider what rights there might be to compensation. What immunities might apply?